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H

aving myself taken part in what was billed as a “con
versation” with Peter Singer in Melbourne’s Anglican
Cathedral some months ago, I strongly endorse Charles
Camosy’s far more ambitious effort to go “beyond polarization”
with his discussion of Singer’s ethical philosophy. Frequently
referred to in the book is the May 2011 “Christian Ethics Engages
Peter Singer” conference held in Oxford where both Singer and
Camosy gave the opening addresses. Camosy underlines that Singer
has shown he is prepared to work with Christians in the areas of
poverty, the ecology, and animals, and refers to Pope Benedict’s
recommendation in Caritas in Veritate of “fraternal collaboration”
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with all, believers and non-believers, for the achievement of their
common goals of peace and justice.
In his Introduction, Camosy frankly notes that Singer’s “basic
project claims to be one designed to undermine the foundations”
supporting the Christian view of the world (3). His biographical sketch reveals a long rabbinical line in Singer’s family, with
the tragic loss of three of his four grandparents in the Holocaust.
Singer’s parents escaped from Vienna, migrating to Australia
where he grew up. Though he attended a Presbyterian high school,
at Melbourne University he joined the Rationalist Society, with
his principal motive for rejecting God’s existence expressed in
his question, “How could the kind of god Christians describe—
omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent—have allowed
something like the Holocaust to take place?” (5). Since his undergraduate days, Singer has been an activist—against the Vietnam
War, for abortion, and later for animal rights.
Rather than seeing Singer’s ethical views as an insurmountable
barrier to dialogue, Camosy approvingly quotes a fellow Catholic
ethicist, David Hollenbach, SJ: “Differences of vision are not so
total that we are destined to remain eternal strangers to one another” (7). He reminds the reader that Aquinas “spent his entire
career in intellectual solidarity with the thought of the pagan philosopher Aristotle” (8). Camosy’s method in his discussion of the
topics of abortion, euthanasia, our treatment of animals, duties to
the poor, and ethical method, will map out in relation to Singer the
areas of significant agreement, “the surprisingly narrow disagreement,” and how Singer and the church should “push each other”
regarding those narrow areas of disagreement (8).
In Chapter One, Abortion, Camosy notes that “both Peter
Singer and the Roman Catholic Church believe that Roe v Wade
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is bad law and both would prefer a legislative approach to the current public policy” (16). Also, “Singer acknowledges, quite plainly,
that his arguments about the moral status of the fetus also apply
to the newborn baby” (18). Obviously while the church has similarly seen the link between abortion and infanticide, it has drawn
completely different moral conclusions (19). However, in order to
effect an agreement with Singer, who distinguishes between being
a member of the species Homo sapiens and being a human person,
Camosy seems to overstretch his reading both of John Paul II’s
Evangelium Vitae and of the 2008 Vatican document, Dignitas
Personae. Since he refers to the latter document as confirmation
that the church does not “commit itself to the position that the
embryo has a rational soul” (24), it does no harm to see what Dignitas Personae actually says:
Although the presence of the spiritual soul cannot be observed experimentally, the conclusions of science regarding
the human embryo give “a valuable indication for discerning by the use of reason a personal presence at the moment
of the first appearance of a human life: how could a human
individual not be a human person?” Indeed, the reality of the
human being for the entire span of life, both before and after
birth, does not allow us to posit either a change in nature or
a gradation in moral value, since it possesses full anthropological and ethical status. The human embryo has, therefore,
from the very beginning, the dignity proper to a person
(n. 5).
Camosy rightly finds that both Singer and the church “disagree
about the moral value of the potential of the fetus” (27). Camosy
defends the personhood of the unborn human on the basis of “the
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metaphysical distinction that Aristotle and Reichlin make between active and passive potential” (37). He sees human beings as
possessed of an active potential to rationality and self-awareness.
These are “essentially present in our natures as the kinds of things
we are” (39). Despite this crucial disagreement, Camosy points out
that:
Singer has now realized that many of his claims about practical ethics cannot be justified without a fairly strong appeal
to metaphysics—with the result that he is now rethinking
fundamental aspects of his moral theory (40).
So, along with Singer’s “suspicion of the kind of hyper-autonomy
and consumerism which drives the broad support for abortion
rights,” Camosy considers Singer may rethink his approach to
abortion (40).
In Chapter Two, Euthanasia, Camosy notes how Singer and
the church:
share skepticism about whether we should use a brain-
death criterion for determining when a human organism
has died. . . . Remarkably, they also share several conclusions about when one is morally justified in removing life-
sustaining treatment, and even when one is justified in using
pain medication, which will hasten a patient’s death (43).
There is no difficulty in finding agreement with Singer on not
being required to use what the church regards as extraordinary
means to prolong life (57–61), but the church does insist on what
it calls “ordinary means”—the administration of food and water
(whether by natural or artificial means) for those in the so-called
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“persistent vegetative state” (63). Still, Camosy quotes a 2009 response of the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith that notes:
“in remote places or in situations of extreme poverty, the artificial
provision of food and water may be physically impossible;” or “a
patient may be unable to assimilate food and drink;” or “[artificial provision] may be excessively burdensome for the patient or
may cause significant physical discomfort . . .” (64). Despite these
careful qualifications, Camosy’s conclusion perhaps goes too far in
light of the much less qualified interpretations it could lead to: “So
let us be absolutely clear: the Church claims, along with Singer,
that it may be licit to remove patient B’s feeding tube” (65). The
question has to do with the word “may.” Indeed, there follows an
excellent discussion, based on recent practice in the Netherlands
and Oregon, that convincingly argues against Singer’s denial that
permitting euthanasia leads to a “slippery slope” from voluntary to
involuntary euthanasia (68–79).
The next chapter, Non-human animals, includes Singer’s description of the horrendous treatment of animals by factory farms,
along with the consequent recommendation by Camosy that we
altogether abstain from any meat produced from them. Despite
some differences with Singer’s reading of the Christian tradition,
Camosy shows how various Catholic writers today fully agree with
Singer on respect for non-human animals. However, his attempt
to ground the ethical treatment of animals might need a sharper
focus. For example, there is his statement that what “non-human
animals share with human animals, for Thomas Aquinas, is a spiritual reality or soul” (112). In the Aristotelian tradition, “soul” is a
principle of vegetative life in plants, of sensitive life in animals, but
only humans have the capacity for intellectual (or spiritual) life. His
listing of capacities animals share with humans—consciousness,
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rationality, self-
awareness, third-
order reflection, empathy, and
morality (125–26) is a heterogeneous one. Animals are by definition conscious and capable of empathy, but the other four capacities would, I suggest, require radical re-definition if ascribed to
animals. Consequently, not every reader will agree when he says “I
can find no reason to deny to many of them [non-human animals]
a moral status similar to that of human persons” (132). However,
such a conclusion is not necessary for a Catholic to fully adhere
to Camosy’s final conclusions on abstaining from factory farmed
food products and his call for explicit church teaching on the sinfulness of cruelty to animals (135).
Camosy shows in his next chapter, Duties to the Poor, that despite differences, Singer and the church are broadly and strongly
in agreement: “both approaches react strongly against the violence
and injustice that our consumerist and hyper-autonomous culture
inflicts on the vulnerable poor” (176). Then in Chapter Five, Ethical Theory, he wishes to establish common ground between the
church’s moral teaching, which holds certain actions to be intrinsically evil, and Singer’s “preference utilitarianism,” which would
include a consideration of the consequences of various actions
before judging them good or evil. In a section on “A Common
Consequentialist Approach” Camosy quotes John Paul II’s Veritatis Splendor which affirms the teleological character of the moral
life (187). A key statement in that encyclical rejects “the thesis,
characteristic of teleological and proportionalist theories” that it is
impossible to qualify as morally evil certain behavior “apart from a
consideration of the intention” of the agent.
Camosy’s discussion of this point seems to rely on a re-definition
of “teleological” to include the kind of intention that goes beyond
the act to its consequences (204). A problem I would have with
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this notion is that it does not differentiate between a teleology
whose meaning is determined by further considerations beyond
the act itself, and a teleology whose goal occurs in a present moment that is simultaneously before eternity—in the sense of Derrida’s famous remark that “deconstruction is Justice.” 1 The reason
nothing can excuse evil acts like abortion or euthanasia is that the
moment they are committed they are already a lethally grave offence to another human being, whose dignity is rooted in his or
her orientation towards divine reality beyond space and time. And
the author’s reworking of the notion of the value of human life,
treating it as of irreducible rather than infinite value (212), is not
the only time in reading Camosy that I felt Singer could have been
invited to move beyond analytic philosophy to consider the work
of philosophers like Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Marion and
Jacques Derrida. For example, Levinas’ Totality and Infinity, in the
light of the Holocaust, is best seen as a reaffirmation of the infinite
worth of each single human being.
Many readers will find Camosy’s last chapter, Singer’s Shift?, a
real surprise. He mentions how Oxford moral philosopher Derek
Parfit “has apparently convinced Singer to become more open to
objectivity in his moral theory” (215). Singer’s recent writings espouse an ethics that “takes a universal point of view” (216). Rather
than a metaphysical top-down approach, Camosy gives an excellent summary of Jean Porter’s Thomistic view of human nature
from the ground up (226–30), which he convincingly suggests
would be acceptable to Singer’s present state in the development of
his moral thinking. Camosy shows how Porter’s view of objective
1. Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’ ” in: Acts of
Religion (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 243.
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human flourishing and Singer’s new views are close to coinciding.
For Singer, Camosy writes, “Happiness comes when we transcend
our inward-looking concerns and instead identify ourselves with
‘the most objective point of view possible’: the point of view of the
universe” (233).
Camosy’s Conclusion suggests that Singer’s ethics should help
push the church to acknowledge the value of all life, human and
non-human, to have a presumption against violence and death
(though given Singer’s constantly stated views on abortion and euthanasia this might seem unconvincing), and have a presumption
for aiding those in need, those dying without aid, and the most
vulnerable, including animals (246). Christian ethics should push
Singer to clarify his recent move towards an objective ethics and
to include a consideration of sexual ethics, given its importance in
human existence and the generation of children (247–49).
The common ground Camosy foresees Singer and the church
moving together on is their shared critique of the self-centered
individualist over against an other-centered lifestyle (251). Camosy
has already mentioned collaboration in the eradication of “absolute poverty” and expresses the hope for a rethink on abortion and
euthanasia from Singer and his followers (252). So the question is:
Has Camosy succeeded in moving the debate with Singer “beyond
polarization”? While I have expressed differences with some of his
analyses, the generosity of his approach provides a model for dialogue which by that very attempt already moves the ethical debate
to the most basic of all contexts, where we respect one another’s
views, and are able to learn both from the perceived strengths and
limits of the other as well as from the strengths and limits the
other may discover in us.
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